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Abstract 
 
This study analyzes the benefits of statewide policy intervention in reducing COVID-19 deaths 
and the costs of that intervention in lost jobs and lower real gross state product (RGSP).    Policy 
interventions are measured by the Oxford stringency index which places a daily numerical value 
on the level of a state’s policy intervention.   
 
Empirical evidence is provided that shows policy interventions have reduced COVID-19 deaths 
by 375,000 lives in 2020.  On the cost side, it was found that policy intervention resulted in a 
loss of 7.3 million jobs and a decline of $410 billion in RGSP. 
 
The study concludes by integrating the findings related to the benefits and costs of policy 
interventions to the economic cost per life saved for every state, as well as an estimate of the 
national average cost per life of $1.1 million. That figure is compared to an age-adjusted value of 
statistical life (VSL) calculated in the study of $4.4 million for COVID-19 fatalities. 
 
 
Keywords:  COVID-19, empirical, benefits and costs, policy intervention, Oxford stringency 
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the benefits and costs associated with policy interventions designed to 
reduce the infection and death rates of COVID-19 is critically important.  COVID-19 is the 
most significant health threat of our time.  As shown below in Figure 1, the COVID-19 death 





Several academic studies have attempted to study the benefits and costs related to policy 
interventions to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus and reduce its death rate.  
Unfortunately, most of these studies were conducted during the early months of the 
pandemic.  Even these early studies, though, do not address the impact at the state level or 
examine the economic impact of policy interventions on jobs or spending. 
In a study by Robinson, Sullivan, and Shogren, for example, the inquiry focuses on the 
relationship between age and the value of a statistical life (VSL) (Robinson, Sullivan, and 
Shogren, 2020).  They use various approaches in measuring VSL to examine the empirical 
findings cited in other studies, but they do not independently measure the benefits and costs 
related to policy intervention. 
One of the studies they cite is “The Benefits and Costs of Using Social Distancing to 
Flatten the Curve for COVID-19” (Thunstrom et al., 2020).  The authors of this study use 
estimates of the impact of social distancing used by Australia in controlling the spread of the 
1918 Spanish flu to measure the impact of social distancing in reducing the mortality risk of 
COVID-19.  Not only is the use of data relating to the Spanish flu suspect, but these data 
relate only to social distancing rather than the full range of policy interventions.  As they 
conclude, “While there may be other combinations of policies that could be adopted for this 
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Greenstone and Nigam also focus their investigation on the impact of social distancing on 
COVID-19 deaths.  No other policy interventions are considered.  There is also no analysis 
relating to the cost side of the equation. 
Dave et al. examine how shelter-in-place orders affect COVID-19 during the early 
months of the pandemic.  The focus is on measuring the effectiveness of the timing of the 
orders on the virus, not to the costs and benefits of policy intervention (Dave et al., 2020). 
In “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the COVID-19 Disease,” Rowthorn and Maciejowski’s 
interest is “in the cost-benefit analysis of large-scale interventions such as lockdowns” 
(Rowthorn ad Maciejowski, 2020, page 539).  The only intervention evaluated is that of 
lockdowns, and the analysis relates to Britain – not the U.S.  
Spiegel and Tookes create their own measure relating to business restrictions for every 
county in the U.S. and use those measures to forecast the impact on COVID-19 deaths 
(Spiegel and Tookes, 2020).  They state, “We focus on fatalities rather than cases because of 
substantial variation on testing capacity over time and region.”  The authors find that policy 
intervention at the county level predicts lower 4 to 6 weeks ahead fatality growth.  This 
study, however, as impressive as it is in attempting to measure the extent of policy 
intervention at the county level, does not analyze the costs of the interventions. 
In the study to follow, the emphasis will be on measuring the benefits and costs of 
statewide policy interventions in reducing the rate of COVID-19 deaths.  Policy interventions 
are measured by using the Oxford stringency index.  The costs of policy intervention will  
measure the impact on each state’s jobs and real gross state product.  The period of analysis 
will be the full calendar year 2020. 
There are several important areas of benefits and costs that will not be addressed in this 
study.  It will not examine the benefits that might occur if policy interventions help prevent 
the health care system from being overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients.  Neither does it 
consider the costs relating to increasing death rates, mental health, or other health problems 
associated with people not getting needed health care because they are discouraged from 
seeking medical treatment. 
While these benefits and costs are relevant and important, this study’s aim is to focus on 
how policy interventions at the state level benefit society by reducing death rates but, in 
doing so, incur costs relating to lost jobs and income.  The study will conclude by estimating 
the economic cost per life saved for each state resulting from policy interventions and 
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2. Theoretical Model 
2.1 Benefits from Policy Intervention 
The benefits from policy intervention are depicted graphically in Figure 2, where the 
downward sloping, D, points to an inverse relationship between COVID-19 deaths and 
stringency, where stringency measures the degree to which individuals protect themselves 
from being infected by the virus. 
Even in a world with no policy intervention, it is reasonable to assume that individuals 
would voluntarily self-protect themselves from infection.  Self-protection might include 
wearing a mask, distancing themselves from others, and avoiding crowds.  Such voluntary 
levels of stringency where there is no policy intervention can be depicted in Figure 2 at an 
average stringency level of S0.  At that level, the intersection of S0 and D points to COVID-
19 deaths of D0. 
If public policy intervention results in a shift to a higher level of stringency, S1, the 





The costs of policy intervention on jobs (J) and income (Y) are graphically shown in the 
two graphs in Figure 3.  As in Figure 2, S0 represents the average voluntary level of 
stringency with no public intervention.  As stringency increases from S0 to S1, as a result of 
policy intervention, the costs to the economy are reflected by a decline in jobs from J0 to J1 
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In the study to follow, Section 3 will address how an increase in policy intervention such 
as that shown in the above figures by the shift from S0 to S1 can be measured.  Section 3 will 
also present an empirical model for estimating the change in the number of deaths, Δ D, from 
policy intervention (see Figure 2).  Section 4 will examine how greater stringency as shown 
by S0 to S1 results in lower jobs, Δ J, while section 5 shows how it results in lower income, Δ 
Y (see Figure 3).  Before concluding, Section 6 will construct an age-adjusted dollar value of 
a statistical life for a person dying from COVID-19 and compare that value to the cost per life 
saved as estimated in this study. 
 
 
3. Measuring the Benefits – Changes in Deaths, Δ D, Resulting from Policy Intervention 
3.1  Empirical Model 
The cumulative COVID-19 death rate per 100,000 people by state from January 1, 2020, 
to January 1, 2021, serves as the dependent variable in a cross-section model tested in this 
study.  These death rates by state in alphabetical and rank order from highest to lowest are 
shown in Table 1.  Note that the unweighted average COVID-19 death rate of all states is 
different from the death rate for the U.S. shown in Figure 1. 
Policy interventions are measured by the Oxford daily government stringency index.  
Using a scale from 1 to 100, the ordinal daily measures that comprise the Oxford index 
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 School closings 
 Workplace closings 
 Cancellation of public event 
 Restrictions on gathering size 
 Closures of public transit 
 Stay at home requirements 
 Restrictions on internal movements 
 Restrictions on international travel 
 Public information campaign 
 Testing polling 
 Contact tracing 
 
The daily Oxford stringency index in this study was derived by calculating an annual 
average from the daily index values for each state during the 1/1/20 to 12/31/20 period.  The 
average Oxford stringency index values for all states in alphabetical order and rank order 
from highest to lowest over the 1/1/20 to 12/31/20 period are shown in Table 2.  Since the 
average stringency index, S, equals 42.12 in calendar year 2020, the shift from S0 to S1 shown 
graphically in Figures 2 to 3 can be represented numerically as a shift from 0 to 42.12. 
Figure 4 shows the daily Oxford stringency index values for the U.S., and for 
comparison, it also shows the state with the highest average index (New Mexico) and the 
state with the lowest (South Dakota). Error! Bookmark not defined. 
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TABLE 2
Average Oxford Stringency Index Values from 1/1/20 to 12/31/20




Jan 1, 2020 -       
Dec 31, 2020 State
Average 
Stringency Score 
Jan 1, 2020 -        
Dec 31, 2020
Alabama 30.60 New Mexico 60.70
Alaska 44.69 Hawaii 58.55
Arizona 35.76 New York 58.26
Arkansas 36.09 Maine 55.35
California 51.29 Rhode Island 55.24
Colorado 45.25 California 51.29
Connecticut 50.76 Connecticut 50.76
Delaware 49.15 Vermont 50.03
Florida 40.99 Delaware 49.15
Georgia 39.96 Kentucky 48.96
Hawaii 58.55 Maryland 48.25
Idaho 39.75 Ohio 47.54
Illinois 45.04 Massachusetts 47.44
Indiana 37.86 North Carolina 46.90
Iowa 26.39 Minnesota 46.53
Kansas 38.27 Washington 46.25
Kentucky 48.96 Colorado 45.25
Louisiana 41.41 Illinois 45.04
Maine 55.35 Alaska 44.69
Maryland 48.25 Oregon 43.98
Massachusetts 47.44 West Virginia 43.49
Michigan 42.14 Texas 42.73
Minnesota 46.53 Pennsylvania 42.47
Mississippi 36.54 Michigan 42.14
Missouri 36.08 New Jersey 41.95
Montana 40.38 Virginia 41.63
Nebraska 35.88 Louisiana 41.41
Nevada 38.17 Florida 40.99
New Hampshire 40.22 Montana 40.38
New Jersey 41.95 New Hampshire 40.22
New Mexico 60.70 Georgia 39.96
New York 58.26 Idaho 39.75
North Carolina 46.90 Wyoming 38.78
North Dakota 28.30 Tennessee 38.49
Ohio 47.54 Kansas 38.27
Oklahoma 29.61 Nevada 38.17
Oregon 43.98 Indiana 37.86
Pennsylvania 42.47 Wisconsin 36.89
Rhode Island 55.24 Mississippi 36.54
South Carolina 34.18 Arkansas 36.09
South Dakota 18.38 Missouri 36.08
Tennessee 38.49 Nebraska 35.88
Texas 42.73 Arizona 35.76
Utah 32.34 South Carolina 34.18
Vermont 50.03 Utah 32.34
Virginia 41.63 Alabama 30.60
Washington 46.25 Oklahoma 29.61
West Virginia 43.49 North Dakota 28.30
Wisconsin 36.89 Iowa 26.39
Wyoming 38.78 South Dakota 18.38
Average 42.12 Average 42.12
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The annual average of the Oxford daily stringency index will serve in this study as a 
proxy for each state’s policy interventions.  But in measuring the explanatory impact of 
policy interventions, it will be necessary to control and test for other demographic and 
socioeconomic variables that may significantly affect COVID-19 death rates. 
Following a functional form similar to that used by Doti (Doti, Journal of Bioeconomics, 
2021), Equation (1) shown below was tested. 
 
 di  = bo +   bm si + ∑ bd,3d=1   Densityi +  ∑ by2y=1  Incomei + 
                       ∑ br3r=1  Racial/Ethnici +  ∑ bh4h=1  Age/Healthi    (1)         
       
     All the dependent and independent variables are defined in Table 3. 
 
 The subscript i refers to state i. 
      
   bo, bm, bd, by, br, bh = Parameters to be estimated 
 
            Note: Displays of error terms are suppressed. 
 
 














1/1/20 2/1/20 3/1/20 4/1/20 5/1/20 6/1/20 7/1/20 8/1/20 9/1/20 10/1/20 11/1/2012/1/20
FIGURE 4
Oxford Stringency Index for the U.S., New Mexico and South Dakota
New Mexico
South Dakota
Average of 50 States  - ca lculated average of a l l  50 s tates  (Not including vi rgin i s lands  an  









3.2  Empirical Findings 
TABLE 3.   Dependent and independent variables used in Equation (1) and Equations 1 - 6, Table 4
Dependent variables
Description Name Mean SD CV Min Max Obs. Source
COVID-19 cumulative death rates through 12/31/20 d 101.76 46.66 45.85 20.00 216.00 50 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1109011/c
oronavirus-covid19-death-rates-us-by-state/
Independent variables
I.    Policy Intervention
Mean Oxford Stingency Index from 1/1/20 to 12/31/20 s 42.12 8.25 19.61 18.38 60.70 50 https://github.com/OxCGRT/USA-covid-
policy/blob/master/data/OxCGRT_US_latest.csv
II.   Density Variables
Population density per square mile density 202.65 266.24 131.38 1.30 1207.80 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-
rankings/state-densities
Super density per square mile sdensity 342.98 1610.69 469.62 0.00 11076.00 50 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_St
ates_cities_by_population_density
Urban population as a percentage of the total 
population
urbanpop 0.74 0.15 20.27 0.39 0.95 50 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urbanization_in_t
he_United_States
     
III.   Income Variables
Per Capita Personal Income (000) py 54.50 8.80 16.15 39.36 79.09 50 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/release/tables?rid=1
51&eid=257197
Poverty rate, percent of persons in poverty poverty 0.14 0.04 28.57 0.07 0.27 50 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._state
s_and_territories_by_poverty_rate
IV.  Racial/Ethnic Variables  
Black or  African American Population as a percentage of 
the total population
afram 10.51 9.55 90.87 0.40 37.60 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/stat
es-by-race
Hispanic population as a percentage of the total 
population
hispanic 11.74 10.34 88.07 1.50 48.54 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-
rankings/hispanic-population-by-state
Asian population as a percentage of the total population asian 4.18 5.53 132.30 0.76 37.75 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-
rankings/asian-population
V.  Age/Health Variables
Percentage of population aged 65 or over age65 16.49 1.88 11.40 11.10 20.60 50 https://www.prb.org/which-us-states-are-the-
oldest/
Obesity rate obesity 30.75 3.73 12.13 22.60 38.10 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-
rankings/obesity-rate-by-state
Diabetes mortality rate diabetes 21.95 4.39 20.00 14.60 36.20 50 https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/pressroom/sosmap/
diabetes_mortality/diabetes.htm
Smoking Rate smokers 17.33 3.50 20.20 8.90 26.00 50 https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-
rankings/smoking-rates-by-state
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A step-wise regression model similar to that used by Doti (Doti, Journal of 
Bioeconomics, 2021) added explanatory variables in groupings from I to IV, as shown in 
Table 3.  The regression results are presented in Equations 1 to 6, Table 4.  Note that except 
for the policy intervention variable, s, in Equation 1, Table 4, other variables were removed if 
not significant at the p < 0.10 level (one-tailed).  The rationale for retaining the policy 
intervention variable, s, in Equation 2, Table 4 is that the significance tests for s in Equation 
1, Table 4 may be spurious since there are no other control variables in the equation. Indeed, 
when the density variables, density, and sdensity, were added to Equation 2, Table 4, the 
measured t statistic for s was significant at the p < 0.01 level (one-tailed). 
Note also that the “best” fit equation, Equation 6, Table 4, is shown as shaded. 
 
3.2.1 Policy Intervention Variable, s 
 
Although a great deal of controversy has arisen over the efficacy of statewide policy 
interventions to control the spread of COVID-19 (Boston Review, 2020; Healthline, 2020; 
Wall Street Journal, 2020), more rigorous studies have shown that such interventions 
significantly reduce COVID-19 deaths (Doti, Journal of Bioeconomics, 2021). 
The empirical results shown in Table 4, which extend the tests through the end of 2020, 
confirm Doti’s earlier findings of a highly significant inverse relationship between policy 
interventions as measured by the Oxford stringency index and COVID-19 death rates by state 
(Doti, Journal of Bioeconomics, 2021).  The measured t statistic of -4.30 for s in Equation 6, 
Table 4, is highly significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed).  Its estimated coefficient of -2.48 
suggests that, on average, a state’s COVID-19 death rate, d, decreases by 2.48 deaths per 
100,000 for every increase of 1 point in a state’s average Oxford stringency index, s. 
In a regression equation (not reported here), the R2 term for Equation 6, Table 4, when the 
policy intervention variable, si, is excluded from the equation, drops from 0.67 to 0.53.  A 
scatter diagram that compares the residuals from the equation where s is excluded is shown 
in Figure 5. 
         
 





TABLE 4.     Regression results,  dependent variable definition: cumulative deathrate (COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 people by state) 
                   from 1/1/20 to 1/1/21, dependent variable name:  d
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6
R-squared 0.02 0.54 0.66 0.68 0.67 0.67
Constant 136.29 198.07 91.31 131.45 157.81 126.27
(-3.97) *** (-5.59) *** (-1.69) * (-4.79) *** (-2.30) ** (-4.68) ***
I.  Policy Intervention
s -0.82 -2.77 -2.86 -2.64 -2.61 -2.48
(-1.02) (-4.36) *** (-5.16) *** (-4.42) *** (-3.94) *** (-4.30) ***
II. Density Variables
density 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12
(5.23) *** (5.44) *** (6.75) *** (6.34) *** (7.27) ***
sdensity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(3.65) ** (3.66) *** (3.99) *** (3.83) *** (4.05) ***
urbanpop -9.13
(-0.23)
III.  Income Variables
py 0.66
(0.88)
poverty 494.54 380.14 401.95 408.23
(3.66) *** (3.05) *** (3.19) *** (3.79) ***





Asian -1.39 -1.27 -1.26
(-1.68) ** (-1.40) * (-1.55) *









Notes:  t statistics in parentheses. *p‹0.10,   **p‹0.05,   ***p‹0.01 (one-tailed test)
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Although Figure 5 suggests a linear trendline, a double logarithmic form of Equation 




























Comparing Mean Oxford Stringency Index, s
TABLE 5













III.  Income Variables
poverty 0.66
(2.68) ***
III.  Racial/Ethnic Variables
Asian -0.13
(-1.43) *
Notes:  t statistics are in parentheses where  *p‹0.10,   **p‹0.05,   ***p‹0.01 (one-tailed test)
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Although the R2 of 0.45 in the double logarithmic form of the Equation is lower than the 
R2 of 0.62 in the linear form of the equation (Equation 6, Table 4), the measured t statistic 
for the ln of s is still significant at the p < 0.01 level.  In spite of the lower R2 value in the 
double logarithmic form of the equation, the coefficients have the desirable quality of 
representing constant elasticities across different values of the independent variables.  That 
means that the -1.05 coefficient for the ln of s represents the constant elasticity of d with 
respect to s, which, in turn, suggests that a one percent increase in the Oxford stringency 
index, s, leads approximately to a one percent decline in COVID-19 deaths, d.  For 
comparison purposes, the average elasticity for s in the linear form is shown in Equation (2). 
 
 
               Ei  = bm      
s
d 
   = -2.48   42.12 
101.76
   = -1.03 (2) 
 
 
Although the average elasticity of -1.03 in the linear form of the equation compares 
closely to the constant elasticity of -1.05 in the double logarithmic form of the equation, the 
elasticity of -1.03 in the linear form of the equation will change as s deviates from its mean 
value of 42.12. 
 
3.2.2 Other Explanatory Variables 
 
A super density variable, sdensity, was added as a variable to measure the impact on 
COVID-19 deaths for those states where a highly populated metropolitan area like New York 
City exhibits extremely high density.  In those instances, the true nature of a metropolitan 
area’s density is obscured when dividing by the entire land area of a state.  To capture that 
impact, a sdensity variable was added as defined in Equation (3). 
 
sdensityi,t =   ∑ pk,i / Pi,t 
ni
k=1   * densityi,t     (3) 
 
where pk,i = Population of the kth city in state i with a population    
            >300,000 and density >10,000 per sq. mile 
   ni   = Number of cities in state i with population >300,000 and 
                                             density >10,000 per sq. mile 
  Pi,t   = Population of state i as of some period t 
               densityi,t   = Density of state i as of some period t 
 
As shown in Equation 6, Table 3, both the sdensity and density variables were significant 
at the p < 0.01 level (one-tailed) and supportive of the theory that higher density facilitates 
virus transmission. 
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The poverty variable in Equation 6, Table 3, was also highly significant.  Its positive 
coefficient suggests that poverty is associated with higher rates of COVID-19 deaths.  In the 
double logarithmic form of the equation reported in Table 5, the constant elasticity of 0.66 
suggests that a one percent increase in a state’s poverty rate leads to a 0.66 percent increase 
in its COVID-19 death rate. 
The only Racial/Ethnic variable that tested as significant was that represented by the 
percentage of Asian-Americans.  Its negative coefficient of -1.26 suggests that an increase of 
one in the percentage of Asian-Americans living in a state is associated with a 1.26 percent 
decline in its COVID-19 death rate.  While the relationship was significant, it was at a 
relatively low p < 0.10 level (one-tailed).  As pointed out by Doti (Doti, Journal of 
Bioeconomics, 2021), a possible explanation for this is anecdotal evidence that Asian-
Americans responded more quickly in adopting safe-distancing and mask-wearing before 
such preventive measures were mandated by governments (Magnier, South China Morning 
Post, 2020).   This explanation received empirical support in the Doti study (Doti, Journal of 
Bioeconomics, 2021) that showed that the asian variable was only significant during the first 
half of 2020. 
The fact that the percentage of African-Americans (afram) and Hispanics (Hispanic) in a 
state was found to have no significant impact on COVID-19 deaths runs counter to other 
studies that suggest a positive causal relationship (Mangier, 2020, APM Research, 2020).  It 
is likely, though, that those studies did not adequately control for the impact of other 
explanatory variables.  When, for example, a variable measuring the poverty rate is omitted 
from Equation 6, Table 4, the coefficients for the African-American variable (afram) and 
Hispanic variable (Hispanic) are both significant, as shown below in Table 6.  These 
empirical results suggest that studies that have found a positive relationship between 
COVID-19 deaths and the percentage of African-Americans and Hispanics in a state or 
metropolitan area may be experiencing identification error. 
 




None of the coefficients for the Age/Health variables were significant.  Although these 
results may seem surprising, especially for the age65 variable, it is likely that there is not 
enough dispersion in the Age/Health variables for the regression equation to pick up any 
significant explanatory power at the state level.  As shown in Figure 4, higher death rates at 
the state level occurred near the average of 16.49 percent > Age65 for all states rather than at 
higher outlying values (Doti, Journal of Bioeconomics, 2021). 
 
TABLE 6













III.  Income Variables
lpoverty Removed form Equation 6, Table 4







Notes:  t statistics are in parentheses where  *p‹0.10,   **p‹0.05,   ***p‹0.01 (one-tailed test)




3.2.3 Impact of Policy Intervention on COVID-19 Lives Saved or Lost 
 
The estimated coefficient for the stringency variable, sjanjul can be used to estimate the 
change in the number of deaths (Δ Di,t) as a result of a state having a stringency index above 
zero.  Those estimates are presented in Table 7 and are based on Equation (4). The Δ Di term 
in  Equation (4) is the same Δ D term shown graphically in Figure 2 where D0 – D1 < 0. 
 
          Δ Di   =   si,   * b�m  *  Pi / 100,000     (4) 
 
         where   Δ Di  = Change in the number of COVID-19 deaths in 2020 in 
                                  state i as a result of policy intervention 
                                    si    = The average stringency index in 2020 for state i  
              b�m  = The estimated coefficient for the stringency index value  
            (See Equation 6, Table 4) 
                          Pi   = The population of state i in 2020 
 
Note that the above equation requires that the product include [ Pi,t / 100,000 ] to convert 
death rates per 100,000 to the absolute number of lives saved or less. 
As shown in Table 7, the estimated reduction in the total number of COVID-19 deaths in 
all states as a result of each state’s policy intervention is -358,000.  Since the total number of 
actual COVID-19 deaths in the U.S. in 2020 was 342,000, the estimated decrease of about 
358,000 deaths suggests that the actual number of deaths would have been about double the 
actual level (342,000 + 358,000 = 700,000) had there been no intervention beyond S0 = 0.  



















Percentage of Popula�on by State > Age 65
FIGURE 6
Death Rate for Age 65 or Over Popula�on at the State Level




Section 4 that follows will examine economic costs associated with the impact of policy 
intervention on each state’s jobs. 
FIGURE 7
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TABLE 7
The impact on COVID-19 Llives Saved as a Result of Each State's Level of Policy Intervention
State































29 New Hampshire -1,356
30 New Jersey -9,240
31 New Mexico -3,157
32 New York -28,109
33 North Carolina -12,199





39 Rhode Island -1,451
40 South Carolina -4,365
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4. Measuring the Costs – Change in Jobs, Δ J, Resulting from Policy Intervention 
4.1 Empirical Model 
In order to measure the impact of policy intervention as measured by the Oxford 
stringency index on jobs, it will be necessary to hold constant other variables that exert an 
influence on job growth.  Although more restrictive policy interventions to control the spread 
of COVID-19 would be expected to reduce jobs, the impact on each state’s jobs will also 
depend on other factors. 
To isolate the impact of policy interventions on jobs in 2020, one must hold constant each 
state’s natural economic growth rate.  Two states with the same stringency index but 
exhibiting different economic trends are likely to experience different rates of job loss.  
Unless those differing trends are accounted for in a regression test, the coefficients that 
measure the impact of differing levels of policy intervention will be biased. 
A straightforward approach to account for each state’s economic growth potential is to 
assume that annual job growth in 2020 would be similar to that which otherwise would have 
occurred in 2019 if COVID-19 had not occurred.  West Virginia, for example, lost about 1 
percent of its jobs in 2019.  Because of that relatively weak economic performance, West 
Virginia would be expected to lose more jobs than other states in 2020, not necessarily 
because of its policy response to COVID-19 but because its economy is weaker than other 
states.  Similarly, one would expect that Utah’s relatively strong job growth of nearly 3 
percent in 2019 will have a positive impact on its job performance in 2020. 
Another state-specific economic factor that needs to be held constant is the proportion of  
its total jobs in leisure & hospitality.  As shown in Figure 8, that sector took the brunt of the 
COVID-19 hit in the U.S., losing almost 50 percent of its jobs in April 2020.  That compares 
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The functional form of an equation that incorporates the impact of each state’s policy 
intervention, its underlying economic strength, and its dependence on the leisure & 
hospitality job sector is shown below Equation (5). 
 
               pji = b0 + bj (si) + bn (pj19i) + bh (jlh19i)   (5) 
    
            where     pji = Annual percentage change in jobs in 2020 in state i 
                            si  = Average Oxford stringency index in 2020 in state i   
                        pj19i = Annual percentage change in jobs in 2019 in state i 
                             jlh19i = Average proportion of total jobs in leisure & hospitality 
             in 2019 in state i 
                        
                bo, bj, bn, bh are parameters to be estimated 
 
Note: Displays of error terms are suppressed. 
 
The hypothesized signs of association in Equation (5) are shown in Equation (6): 
                                                               -     +        - 
             pji = f ( si;  pj19i;  jlh19i)     (6) 
   
4.2 Empirical Findings 
Table 8 presents the empirical results for the regression tests of Equation (5).  Note that 
all of the coefficients for the above variables have the hypothesized signs of association 


















Notes:  t statistics are in parentheses where  *p‹0.10,   **p‹0.05,   ***p‹0.01 (one-tailed test)
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The coefficient of -0.11 for s suggests that a one point increase (decrease) in the 
stringency index, s, leads to a 0.11 decrease (increase) in job growth in 2020 (pj). 
 
4.2.1 Impact of Policy Interventions on the Number of Jobs (Δ Ji) 
As in this study’s analysis of the impact of policy intervention on COVID-19 deaths 
presented in Section II, a similar methodology can be used to measure the impact of policy 
intervention on jobs.  The number of jobs saved by having stringency index values above 
zero is given by Equation (7).  The Δ Ji term is the same Δ J term shown graphically in Figure 
3 where J0 – J1< 0. 
 
               Δ Ji,  =   si    *   b� j / 100   * j19i              (7) 
 
         where Δ Ji  = Number of jobs lost (-) or saved (+) in 2020 in state i 
                       si   = The average stringency index in 2020 for state i 
                   J19i   = Average number of jobs in 2019 in state i    
                     b� j  = The estimated coefficient of -0.11 for the policy intervention  
                      variable, si, as shown in Table 8 
 
Note that the above equation requires that the estimated coefficient, b� j, be divided by 100 
to convert from percentage to decimal changes.  The estimates based on Equation (7) above 
are presented in Table 9. 
    As shown in Table 9, the estimated loss in jobs in all states as a result of each state’s 
policy intervention is about -7.3 million.  Since the average number of jobs in 2020 was 142 
million, the estimated loss of 7.3 million jobs suggests that the actual number of jobs would 
have been 149.3 million (142 million + 7.3 million) had there been no policy intervention 
beyond S0.  These results are shown graphically in the following Figure 9. 
In percentage terms, the loss of 7.3 million jobs represents a decline of 4.8 percent from 
the job total in 2019.  That compares to an actual decline in jobs of 6.3 percent. The ratio of 
the 4.8 decline in jobs resulting from policy intervention to the actual total decline of 6.3 
percent is 0.75.  That, in turn, suggests that the increase in stringency from S0 to S1 or 0 to 42 
accounts for 75 percent of the total loss of jobs in 2020.   
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TABLE 9
The Impact on Jobs Lost as a Result of Each State's Level of Policy Intervention
 Δ ji
State
(Change in the 





























29 New Hampshire -30,476
30 New Jersey -194,866
31 New Mexico -57,597
32 New York -631,344
33 North Carolina -237,572





39 Rhode Island -30,806
40 South Carolina -82,875
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To measure the impact of policy intervention on total spending, the following Section IV 
focuses on changes in real gross state product (RGSP).  That analysis will allow for 
estimating the dollar cost of each life saved or lost, resulting from a state’s policy 
intervention. 
 
5. Measuring the Costs – Change in Income, Δ Y, Resulting from Policy Intervention 
5.1 Empirical Model 
A version of the model presented in Section 4 for measuring the impact of policy 
intervention on jobs can be used in this section to measure the impact on real gross state 
product (RGSP).  As in Section 4, differences in a state’s Oxford average stringency index in 
2020 is used to measure the impact of policy intervention.  Instead of using percentage 
changes in jobs in 2019 to measure the underlying job-producing strength of a state before 
COVID-19 hit, percentage changes in RGSP in 2019, py19, serve as a proxy for the income-
producing potential of a state’s economy. 
In the national income accounts, an “Art, Entertainment, Accommodations and Food 
Services” category is used to measure spending in leisure & hospitality.  Similar to Section 4, 
where the proportion of leisure & hospitality jobs is used to measure a state’s dependence on 
the job sector hardest hit by COVID-19, the proportion of RGSP in “Art, Entertainment, 
Accommodation and Food Services” will serve as a proxy for that variable. 
The functional form of an equation explaining each state’s RGSP as a function of policy 
intervention, a state’s underlying economic strength, and its dependence on the Arts, 
Entertainment, Accommodation, and Food Services sector of the economy is shown in 
Equation (8). 
 
       pyi = b0 + bg (si) + by (py19i) + ba (ae19i)   (8) 
 
        where pyi = Annual percentage change in RGSP in 2020 in state i 
                     si  = Average Oxford stringency index in 2020 in state i   
                py19i = Annual percentage change in RGSP in 2019 in state i 
                       ae19i = Average proportion of total RGSP in arts, entertainment,  
       accommodation and food services in 2019 in state i 
                    
            bo, bg, by, ba are parameters to be estimated. 
 
                    Note: Displays of error terms are suppressed. 
 
The hypothesized signs of association in Equation (8) are shown below in Equation (9): 
                                   
                      -     +         - 
        pyi = f (si;  py19i;  ae19i)     (9) 
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5.2 Empirical Findings 
Table 10 presents the empirical results for the regression test of Equation (8).  Note that 
all of the coefficients for the variables in Equation (8) have the hypothesized signs of 






The estimated coefficient of -0.05 for s suggests that a one-point increase (decrease) in 
the stringency index (s) leads to a 0.05 decrease (increase) in RGSP growth in 2020 (py).  
This result is about half the -0.11 estimated coefficient for s in Section 3, explaining 
percentage changes in jobs, pj (see Table 8).  These findings are intuitively plausible since 
changes in stringency are likely to have a greater percentage impact on jobs than income.  
Jobs in leisure-related activities have a lower value-added than other job categories.  As a 
result, the impact of disproportionately large leisure-related job losses will be muted when 























Notes:  t statistics are in parentheses where  *p‹0.10,   **p‹0.05,   ***p‹0.01 (one-tailed test)
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5.2.1 Impact of Policy Intervention on the level of RGSP 
The increase or decrease in a state’s RGSP by having stringency index values lower or 
higher than average is given by Equation (10).  
 
                      Δ Yi   =    si     *   b�m / 100   * Y19i    (10) 
 
            where Δ Yi = Change in the level of RGSP in 2020 in state i 
                          si   = The average stringency index in 2020 for state i 
                        b�m  = The estimated coefficient of -0.05 for the policy intervention   
                           variable as shown in Table 10 
                       Y19i = Average RGSP in 2019 in state i 
 
         and all other variables are as defined in Equation 10. 
 
Note that the above equation requires that the estimated coefficient, b�m, be divided by 
100 to convert from percentage to decimal changes.  The estimates for Δ Yi based on 
Equation (10)  above are presented in Table 11. 
As shown in Table 11, the estimated loss in RGSP for all states as a result of each state’s 
policy intervention is about $410 billion.  Since RGSP in 2020 was about $18,500 billion,  
the estimated loss of $410 billion suggests that RGSP would have been about $18,900 
(18,500 billion + 410 billion) had there been no policy intervention beyond S0.  These results 
are shown graphically in Figure 10. 
In percentage terms, the loss of $410 billion represents a decline of 2.2 percent in RGSP 
in 2020. As expected, given that the negative impact of the COVID-19 recession will be 
greater on jobs than income, the 2.2 percent decline in RGSP is roughly half the decline of 
4.8 percent in jobs as estimated in Section 4.2.1. 
Recall that policy intervention was also shown in Section 4.2.1 to account for 75 percent 
of the total loss in jobs in 2020.  Similarly, the 2.2 percent decline in RGSP resulting from 
policy intervention is about 75 percent of the actual decline of 3 percent in 2020. 
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TABLE 11
The  Impact on RGSP as a Result of Each State's Level of Policy Intervention
Δ yi
State






























29 New Hampshire -1,490
30 New Jersey -11,280
31 New Mexico -2,931
32 New York -41,399
33 North Carolina -11,729





39 Rhode Island -1,425
40 South Carolina -3,549
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6. Estimated Economic Cost Per Life Saved 
 
Table 12 presents an estimated economic cost per life saved based on the total loss in 
RGSP presented in Table 11 and the total number of lives saved (fewer deaths) in Table 7 in 
Section 3.2.3.  These findings, as shown in Table 12, point to an average loss in RGSP of 
$1,145,000 per life saved because of policy interventions.  That cost per life saved ranges 
from a low of $677,813 in Mississippi to a high of $1,472,821 in New York state.  A question 
that arises is whether the per capita costs in Table 12 are reasonable or not.  That question 
turns on the difficult question regarding the value of a human life. 
A great deal of empirical research has been conducted regarding the value of a statistical 
life (VSL) (Robinson, Sullivan, and Shogren; 2020, Murphy and Topel, 2006).  Both the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA, 2016 update) and the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (U.S. HHS, 2016) include VSL estimates in their benefit-cost 
analyses. 
As a standard tool in analyzing benefits and costs, VSL estimates are generally based on 
the values economists measure for the willingness of people to pay for a slight reduction in 
the probability of death (Murphy and Topel, 2006).  For example, if a person is willing to pay 
$8,000 to reduce the probability of death by 0.1 percent, the resulting VSL for that person is 
$8,000/0.001 or $8 million.  Note that this empirical approach captures not only the potential 
lifetime earnings of an individual but the consumption of non-market goods like leisure time. 
VSL is sometimes held at a constant value that does not vary with age (Robinson, 
Sullivan, and Shogren; 2020).  Although most governmental agencies follow that approach, 
as noted by Robinson, Sullivan, and Shogren, “… the HHS (U.S. HHS; 2016) guidance 
recommends adjustments in sensitivity analysis when the risk changes disproportionately to 
the old or the very young.” (Robinson, Sullivan, and Shogren; 2020, page 3). 
That is certainly the case in terms of COVID-19 deaths.  As shown below in Table 13, 
roughly 80 percent of the deaths through year-end 2020 occurred at ages 65 years and above.  
The grouped median age of a COVID-19 death was 78.4.  Using age-adjusted VSL 
(Greenstone and Nigam; 2020) and adjusting the age intervals to conform with the age 
groupings shown in Table 13 makes it possible to calculate a weighted average age-adjusted 
VSL of  $4.2 million, as shown in Table 14. 
The age-adjusted VSL estimate of $4.2 million presented in Table 14 compares closely 
with the $4.47 million estimated by Robinson, Sullivan, and Shogren (2020, page 7) using a 
similar approach. 
The fact that the $4.47 million calculated in Table 14 is significantly above the estimated 
average cost per life saved of $1.15 million, as shown in Table 12, suggests that the cost of 
policy intervention is not excessive, at least when using a VSL methodology to place a dollar 
value on a human life. 
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TABLE 12
The Total Estimated Cost in RGSP Per Life Saved Resulting from
a Stringency Index Above or Below the Mean Index
State
     ΔRGSP20i        
In Millions
Change in Deaths 
Resulting from Policy 
Interventions Above 
or Below the Mean 
Index
Economic Cost per 
Life Saved 
(See Table 11) (See Table 7)
Alabama 1,128 1,400 805,617
Alaska -66 -47 1,407,729
Arizona 1,020 1,148 888,784
Arkansas 346 451 766,027
California -12,574 -8,986 1,399,269
Colorado -551 -448 1,231,730
Connecticut -1,047 -764 1,370,242
Delaware -218 -170 1,285,549
Florida 533 604 882,907
Georgia 577 569 1,015,454
Hawaii -637 -577 1,104,075
Idaho 88 105 835,728
Illinois -1,091 -919 1,187,318
Indiana 698 710 982,987
Iowa 1,331 1,230 1,081,879
Kansas 300 278 1,078,972
Kentucky -633 -758 833,917
Louisiana 81 81 995,240
Maine -376 -441 853,037
Maryland -1,120 -919 1,219,652
Massachusetts -1,339 -910 1,471,493
Michigan -6 -6 910,576
Minnesota -729 -617 1,180,852
Mississippi 279 411 677,813
Missouri 841 919 915,129
Montana 41 46 883,085
Nebraska 360 299 1,202,480
Nevada 292 302 968,257
New Hampshire 70 64 1,098,238
New Jersey 46 37 1,220,731
New Mexico -897 -966 928,688
New York -11,471 -7,788 1,472,821
North Carolina -1,196 -1,244 961,454
North Dakota 361 261 1,383,264
Ohio -1,612 -1,572 1,025,586
Oklahoma 1,177 1,228 958,670
Oregon -205 -195 1,053,076
Pennsylvania -122 -111 1,102,387
Rhode Island -339 -345 982,144
South Carolina 824 1,013 813,137
South Dakota 555 521 1,064,902
Tennessee 570 614 928,625
Texas -523 -440 1,189,531
Utah 821 777 1,055,714
Vermont -113 -122 919,446
Virginia 117 103 1,130,883
Washington -1,124 -780 1,441,195
West Virginia -47 -61 774,593
Wisconsin 774 755 1,026,325
Wyoming 62 48 1,293,556
Average -410,000 -358,000 1,145,000







Deaths Associated with COVID-19 by Age Group in the U.S.
December 30, 2020
Age Group No. of Deaths Percent of Deaths
Death rate per 
100,000 people
Under 1 32                         0.01                           0.85                           
1 - 4 19                         0.01                           0.12                           
 5 - 14 51                         0.02                           0.12                           
15 - 24 483                       0.16                           1.13                           
25 - 34 2,087                   0.69                           4.54                           
35 - 44 5,398                   1.79                           12.96                         
45 - 54 14,496                4.81                           35.46                         
55 - 64 35,981                11.93                         84.76                         
65 - 74 64,355                21.33                         204.41                      
75 - 84 82,646                27.40                         517.51                      
85 and over 96,131                31.87                         1,455.44                   
Total 301,679              100                             91.91                         
TABLE 14
Calculating an Age-Adjusted VSL of COVID-19 Deaths
Age Group
VSL                 
(In Millions)
Percent of Deaths 
(See Table 13)
VSL * Percent of 
Deaths
Under 1 14.70              0.01                           0.15                       
1 - 4 14.70              0.01                           0.15                       
 5 - 14 15.00              0.02                           0.30                       
15 - 24 15.70              0.17                           2.51                       
25 - 34 15.90              0.73                           10.97                     
35 - 44 14.80              1.88                           26.49                     
45 - 54 12.00              5.00                           57.72                     
55 - 64 8.50                 12.23                         101.40                  
65 - 74 4.80                 21.41                         102.39                  
75 - 84 2.60                 27.08                         71.24                     
85 and over 1.50                 31.47                         47.80                     
Sum = 421.11                  
                Age-adjusted VSL = 421.11/100 = $4.2 million
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7. Conclusion 
  
Although there has been much controversy over the efficacy of policy interventions taken 
to reduce the infection and death rates of COVID-19, no studies have systematically 
measured their benefits and costs at the state level.  This study fills that gap by presenting 
cross-section regression analyses that measure how policy interventions, as measured by the 
Oxford stringency index, reduce COVID-19 death rates.  It also examines how those 
interventions increase costs in terms of greater job losses and lower RGSP. 
The study provides empirical support for the belief that policy interventions have resulted 
in lower COVID-19 death rates.  It does this by measuring the impact of policy interventions 
while holding other explanatory variables constant.  The findings suggest that the COVID-19 
death rate decreases by 2.48 deaths per 100,000 in population for every increase of 1 point in 
the Oxford stringency index.  That relationship is used to estimate that COVID-19 deaths 
decreased by 358,000 lives (Table 7) as a result of each state’s level of policy intervention. 
On the cost side of the equation, various economic factors are held constant in order to 
measure the impact of policy intervention on jobs and RGSP for every state.  It was found 
that policy intervention resulted in a loss of about 7.3 million jobs (Table 9) and a decline of 
$410 billion in RGSP for all 50 states (see Table 11). 
Because this study measures lives saved or lost as well as the gains or losses to RGSP, it 
was possible to derive an average cost per life saved in the U.S. of $1,145,000, a cost that 
ranges from a high of $1,472,000 in New York state to a low of $677,000 for Mississippi. 
The study concluded by producing a weighted average age-adjusted value of a statistical 
life (VSL) of $4.2 million, a value significantly above the estimated $1.145 million average 
cost per U.S. life saved. 
Future research should be directed at updating the empirical finding in this study as more 
data become available.  This will be particularly valuable in light of both the recent surge in 
infection and death rates as well as the timing of future decreases in infection and death rates 
as more vaccinations take place.  The findings of this study would also be more complete by 
confronting the empirical challenges involved in removing the assumptions laid out in the 
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